UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25482
29 March 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 26 MARCH 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CROATIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to refer to the letter dated 17 March 1993 (S/25425) by the Chargé d'affaires of the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" (Serbia and Montenegro). The letter is a line of unfounded and poorly argumented allegations that the Belgrade authorities are repeatedly rising against the Republic of Croatia and some other countries. All this is aimed to divert the attention from the ties that the Belgrade regime is strengthening with military establishments of Iraq and Peoples Republic of Korea, and its participation in global arms smuggling network, thus providing, among the others, the arms for the Somali war lords. In this respect we would like to strongly deny such allegations by stressing the following:

1. The Republic of Croatia would like to repeat that it is committed to Security Council resolutions 713 and 724 and is acting, in accordance with its own laws and regulations, to prevent criminal actions that violate these resolutions. In case of any criminal activities and violations possibly performed by an international network of individuals, the authorities of the Republic of Croatia are ready to fully cooperate any Government and in any particular matter. We are ready to submit to the legal procedures any Croatian citizens involved in criminal activities, on the grounds of firm and legally respectful evidence. With this respect we would like to declare that the persons mentioned in paragraph 1 of the letter are not the citizens of the Republic of Croatia.

2. With respect to the allegations against Prime Minister Hrvoje Sarinic and the Institute Rudjer Boskovic, we would like to characterize them as most slanderous insinuations, as they are not argumented and are completely unfounded.

3. The Republic of Croatia has indeed published in 1991 a study entitled "Criteria for the election of sites for thermoenergetic and nuclear objects", which deals with the criteria, and no sites are mentioned. The criteria had been subject to the International Atomic Energy Agency review, and are thus approved.

We would like to stress that the Republic of Croatia has recently become the member of the International Atomic Energy Agency and is fully applying all the provisions of its rules and procedures. The well-established communication

with the IAEA is of the primary interest of the Republic of Croatia, and any inspection at any time and on whatever subject is welcomed.

The Republic of Croatia has on 29 June 1992 jointed the Treaty of Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and is fully complying with its provisions. This treaty was among the first that we have committed ourselves to. The firm stand of our Government is in favour of gradual disappearances of nuclear weapons and preventing its proliferation, and it is firmly determined to cooperate towards achieving that goal. We are supporting the initiatives aimed at strengthening the region of Central and South Europe as nuclear-arms-free zones.

I should be grateful, Your Excellency, if you could have the text of this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mario NOBILO
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25483
29 March 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 29 MARCH 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF AZERBAIJAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On behalf of my Government, I have the honour to inform you about the latest round of the informal consultations of the Minsk Group of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) on the establishment of peace in the Nagorny Karabakh region of the Azerbaijani Republic and the surrounding area, which was held under the chairmanship of Italy in Geneva from 17 to 23 March.

The concept put forward by the Azerbaijani delegation, headed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Tofik Gasymov, was based on a desire to achieve a genuine peaceful settlement and to move on to peaceful negotiations within the framework of the Minsk Conference. In this connection, it proposed a plan for a settlement which called for the full demilitarization of Nagorny Karabakh and other nearby territories in Azerbaijan prior to the Minsk Conference. This proposal would exclude the factor of military force and its negative impact on the course of peaceful negotiations, and would provide an opportunity for the normalization of life in the region and establish conditions for the return of displaced persons to their places of permanent residence.

The proposals by the Azerbaijani delegation included the following:

- Disarming and disbanding of irregular armed units prior to the Minsk Conference and identification and withdrawal of foreign military personnel;

- Monitoring of heavy armaments in order to prevent their use;

- Withdrawal of the Armenian armed forces from the territory of the Lachin district of Azerbaijan and establishment of control on the frontier between Armenia and Azerbaijan (by the Armenians on the Armenian side and by the Azerbaijanis on the Azerbaijani side). International control may be established only in order to ensure the provision of humanitarian assistance by Armenia to Nagorny Karabakh, with the agreement of the Government of Azerbaijan, and to ensure the return of displaced persons to their places of residence.

During the talks the Armenian delegation pursued its own aims, which mainly consisted in maintaining in the territory of the Azerbaijani Republic both the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia and the armed formations of Armenians from the Nagorny Karabakh region of the Azerbaijani Republic, which they support. The proposed maintenance of the situation in the region means in practice that Armenia would retain control over the regions of Azerbaijan now occupied by Armenian armed formations. The implementation of this approach would mean that there would be an opportunity to exert pressure on the Azerbaijani side during the Minsk Conference.

The demilitarization proposal put forward by Azerbaijan was rejected by Armenia. In justification, it was argued that the proposal did not provide guarantees for the security of the Armenian population of the Nagorny Karabakh region of Azerbaijan. In that connection, the Armenian side failed to mention the need for similar guarantees for the security of the Azerbaijani population of Nagorny Karabakh. The Azerbaijani delegation, for its part, declared that the security of the inhabitants of Nagorny Karabakh, both Armenians and Azerbaijanis, can be guaranteed only by the disbanding of the armed formations, the presence of foreign observers and the guarantees given by the Azerbaijani Government.

As the results of the meeting in Geneva show, the achievement of a compromise entails great difficulties and will require intense negotiations; however, the goal that has been set is worth this. Although a final timetable has not yet been worked out for action to establish peace in the Nagorny Karabakh region of Azerbaijan and the surrounding area, it is gratifying that the talks are continuing. A mutually acceptable result can be attained only if there is a sincere desire by the parties to achieve such a result within the framework of the negotiating process. The Azerbaijani side once again reaffirms its commitment to this approach.

Azerbaijan greatly appreciates the support and deep concern of the Security Council and the Secretary-General in connection with the establishment of peace on Azerbaijani soil. We share the view expressed in the documents of the Security Council and in the recent letter from the Secretary-General, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, addressed to the President of the Azerbaijani Republic, Mr. Abulfaz Elchibey, concerning the need to bring the Minsk process within the framework of CSCE to a logical conclusion. We are writing to you in the hope that the efforts of CSCE to resolve the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorny Karabakh region of the Azerbaijani Republic and the delicate results achieved in Rome and Geneva will continue to receive your full support.

The Azerbaijani side intends to continue the search for ways to achieve a political settlement of the conflict during the further round of talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan, scheduled to begin in Geneva on 2 April 1993.

(Signed) Hassan HASSANOV
Permanent Representative

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25484
29 March 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 26 MARCH 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF DENMARK TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text in English and French of a statement on the report of the Commission on the Truth in El Salvador issued by the European Community and its member States on 25 March 1993.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Bent HAAKONSEN
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of Denmark
to the United Nations

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Annex

[Original: English and French]

Statement from the Community and its member States on the report of the Commission on the Truth in El Salvador

The European Community and its member States welcome the submission and publication of the report of the Commission on the Truth in El Salvador.

They express their support for the statement on the report of the Commission on the Truth of 18 March 1993 by the President of the United Nations Security Council.

They believe that an early, full and integral implementation of all recommendations will be crucial for achieving national reconciliation and consolidation of peace in El Salvador.

In this context, the European Community and its member States note with concern that the Salvadorean parliament, upon the Government's initiative, has approved an "extensive, absolute and unconditional" amnesty before the full implementation of the Ad Hoc Commission's recommendations and before putting into effect the conclusions of the Commission on the Truth. They emphasize that this step, which can only contribute positively to national reconciliation if it receives broad support in Salvadorean society, should not prejudice the full implementation of the recommendations of the Commission on the Truth.

UNITED
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Security Council

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S/25485
29 March 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 29 MARCH 1993 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I.
OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF ISRAEL TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I would like to bring to your attention the growing number of terrorist activities directed against Israeli citizens. Militant Islamic fundamentalist groups, such as Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, and other terrorist organizations, such as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), have blazed a trail of bloodshed and violence in the hope of diverting us all away from the road towards reconciliation and peace. Resorting to stabbings, shootings and stonings, the Palestinian terrorists have stepped up their campaign of iniquity. They target Israelis and they target Palestinians, while their main target is the peace process, which they want to kill.

Since 1 March 1993, 12 Israelis have been killed and more than 21 others wounded as a result of terrorist acts. The following is a list of some of the attacks that have taken place:

On 1 March 1993, an Arab terrorist armed with two knives went on a rampage in the streets of Tel Aviv, indiscriminately stabbing innocent passers-by. The terrorist killed Azaryah Natan and Grigory Abramov and wounded seven others. The Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for the attack. The perpetrator was arrested.

On 2 March 1993, Yehoshua Weisbrod, an employee of the Petrolgas company, drove into the city of Rafah, apparently by mistake. He was greeted by an angry crowd, which proceeded to stone his car. Under a hail of rocks, he lost control of his vehicle and crashed into a telephone pole. Two armed members of Fatah then approached his car, and one of them shot Mr. Weisbrod to death at point-blank range.

On 3 March 1993, Nadav Zlotnick, a student at Yeshivat Ateret Cohanim in Jerusalem, was stabbed and injured by an Arab woman from Ramallah, who was arrested.

On 4 March 1993, Amikam Gutman, a student at Yeshivat Shuvu Banim in Jerusalem, was stabbed in the back. The attacker fled the scene.

On 8 March 1993, Uri Magidish, a husband and father of four children and a resident of Gan-Or in Gush Katif, was brutally stabbed to death by two Arab

workers who were riding with him in his car. Evidence linking the perpetrators to Fatah was found near the body.

On 10 March 1993, David Liebeskind, a reserve soldier, was stabbed and seriously wounded on the way to his base in Nazareth. The two terrorists who perpetrated the attack were apprehended.

On 11 March 1993, a terrorist from Khan Yunis stabbed an Israeli resident of Rehovot in his greenhouse. The terrorist has not yet been apprehended.

On 11 March 1993, Assaf Dayan, a 15-year-old youth, was stabbed in the neck by a terrorist at his father's factory near the Erez checkpoint. The terrorist fled the scene but was later apprehended.

On 12 March 1993, terrorists fired at an Israel Defence Forces (IDF) vehicle at the Tapuah junction, wounding two servicemen, Boaz Habster and Yuval Dror.

On 12 March 1993, Simha Levy, a 50-year-old resident of Gush Katif was found dead in the minibus she had used to transport Arab workers to their places of work. Terrorists had struck her in the head with an axe and stabbed her in the neck.

On 12 March 1993, the body of Yehoshua Friedberg, a recent immigrant from Canada who had joined IDF and who had been missing for five days, was found alongside the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem highway. He had been shot in the chest and the neck.

On 15 March 1993, Shlomo Haber, a 22-year-old new immigrant from the United States, was stabbed in the chest in Afula by a terrorist from Shechem (Nablus) and hospitalized. The terrorist was apprehended, and two of his brothers are known to be active in the terrorist group known as the "Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine".

On 15 March 1993, a grenade was thrown at an IDF post in Dir el-Balah, wounding serviceman Yuval Dekel.

On 15 March 1993, a terrorist armed with a knife stabbed and wounded William Belaish and Beit Shemesh. After a brief struggle, the terrorist escaped.

On 20 March 1993, terrorists opened fire on an IDF patrol vehicle in the Jabalya refugee camp, killing a soldier Yossi Shabtai. The terrorists escaped in a getaway car. Hamas and a faction of the Islamic Jihad both claimed responsibility for the attack.

On 20 March 1993, terrorists fired at an IDF patrol jeep near the village of Burkin on the Trans-Samarian Highway near Ariel, killing reserve Corporal Avissar Gitai and wounding two other soldiers. Hamas and the terrorist group known as the "Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine" claimed responsibility for the attack.

On 21 March 1993, an IDF soldier was wounded when shots were fired at an IDF patrol in Khan Yunis.

On 22 March 1993, a terrorist armed with a knife burst into the school yard of the ORT Kennedy High School in the Talpiot neighbourhood of Jerusalem. To shouts of "Allahu Akbar", he proceeded to stab five teenage students and the principal of the school before being subdued and arrested.

On 23 March 1993, terrorists opened fire in Beit Govrin on a vehicle carrying two employees of the Ministry of Agriculture, wounding one of them in the hand and head.

On 23 March 1993, an IDF serviceman was wounded in the leg when shots were fired at an IDF patrol in the Gaza district.

On 27 March 1993, border policeman Jamal Masalha, a Muslim Arab who had volunteered to serve in IDF, was shot to death by a terrorist in Tulkarem.

On 28 March 1993, Yehuda Gawi was stabbed to death by two Arab terrorists in Nisanit, in the Gaza district.

On 28 March 1993, Eli Glicko was stabbed in the back and moderately wounded on the Jerusalem promenade by a terrorist.

The aforementioned attacks were but the most recent in a wave of terror and violence perpetrated by those opposed to the peace process.

It should be noted that the terrorists have also targeted Palestinians. In the month of March 1993 alone, 11 Palestinians have been killed and 8 wounded by other Palestinians. Since the start of the intifadah, 864 Palestinians have been killed and more than 2,242 others injured in attacks carried out by fellow Palestinians.

Hamas, the Islamic Jihad and various factions of the PLO are behind the savage and ruthless attacks outlined above, and they continue to incite their followers to carry out more such attacks.

In an interview on Radio Monte Carlo on 22 March 1993, Yasser Arafat called for "escalating the intifadah" and said that "the ground should burn under the feet of the invaders".

In a radio broadcast on 9 December 1992 marking the anniversary of the beginning of the intifadah, Yasser Arafat said,

> "We are entering the sixth year more determined to intensify our struggle on all fronts in order to step up the intifadah with the thrust of its masses and to promote fierce confrontations with the occupation forces in order to engulf the land with wrath against the usurper ... May the volcanoes of wrath erupt against the usurping occupier in every village, town and camp ... It is revolution until victory, until victory, until victory!" (Voice of Palestine, 9 December 1992; cited in FBIS-NES-92-238, pp. 8-9).

In an interview published in Al-Quds Al-Arabi on 7 January 1993, Fatah Central Committee member Khalid al-Hasan said, "All Zionist leaders at present belong to Europe, thus they belong to racist and Nazi thinking ... continuing and stepping up the struggle inside the occupied territories is essential" (cited in FBIS-NES-93-007, pp. 10-11).

On 26 January 1993, Sheikh Assad Tamimi, head of the Islamic Jihad, told Reuters that his group would try "to promote jihad and to continue to develop our means of armed struggle". He added that, "the more you attack Jews, the more you gain in popular support".

On 12 January 1993, the text of a joint statement of coordination between Hamas and the Unified National Leadership of the Intifadah (UNLI) was issued. The statement said, "UNLI and Hamas call on the strike forces and the throwing hands to coordinate on the field to crown the unified action in order to burn the land beneath the feet of the soldiers ..." (Voice of Palestine, 12 January 1993; cited in FBIS-NES-92-009, p. 5).

The Government of Israel is determined to continue to fight terrorism. At the same time, despite the provocations and despite the terrorist attacks, it is committed to doing its utmost to promote the peace process. We look forward to the resumption of the peace negotiations on the date set by the two co-sponsors of the talks, the United States of America and the Russian Federation, and we hope that all the parties to the negotiations will participate.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Moshe MELAMED
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25485*
31 March 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

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* Reissued for technical reasons.

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volcanoes of wrath erupt against the usurping occupier in every village, town and camp ... It is revolution until victory, until victory, until victory!" (Voice of Palestine, 9 December 1992; cited in FBIS-NES-92-238, pp. 8-9).

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I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Moshe MELAMED
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25486
29 March 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 29 MARCH 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that United States aircraft continued their violations of Iraqi airspace for purposes of reconnaissance and provocation during the period 17 to 25 March 1993.

17 March 1993

(a) Northern region: 24 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 4,000 to 7,500 metres, centred over Zakho, Dohuk, Mosul, Tall Afar, Amadiyah, Irbil and Dukan.

(b) Southern region: 39 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 7,000 to 10,000 metres, centred over Basra, Qurnah, Qal'at Salih, Amarah, Lasaf, Nasiriyah, Samawah, Ushbayjah, Salman, Busayyah, Jalibah and Artawi.

At 1230 hours on 17 March 1993, a United States TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft flying at a speed of 600 kilometres per hour and at an altitude of 20,000 metres penetrated Iraqi airspace in the southern region. It left at 1440 hours.

18 March 1993

(a) Northern region: 12 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 7,500 to 10,000 metres, centred over Mosul, Dohuk, Zakho, Tall Afar and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: 61 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 9,000 metres, centred over Nasiriyah, Samawah, Salman, Basra, Qal'at Salih, Ushbayjah, Jalibah and Busayyah.

19 March 1993

(a) Northern region: No hostile activity was recorded in the northern region on this day.

(b) Southern region: 42 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 7,500 to 9,000 metres, centred over Nasiriyah, Salman, Samawah, Qal'at Salih, Qurnah, Ushbayjah and Busayyah.

20 March 1993

(a) Northern region: 28 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 8,000 metres, centred over Zakho, Dohuk, Ayn Zalah, Mosul, Amadiyah, Irbil and Tall Afar.

(b) Southern region: 22 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 7,000 to 12,000 metres, centred over Jalibah, Nasiriyah, Samawah, Artawi and Salman.

21 March 1993

(a) Northern region: 24 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 8,000 metres, centred over Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Zakho, Tall Afar, Dukan and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: 30 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 7,000 to 10,000 metres, centred over Nasiriyah, Samawah, Salman, Ushbayjah, Jalibah, Basra and Qal'at Salih.

22 March 1993

(a) Northern region: 16 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 9,000 metres, centred over Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Zakho, Tall Afar and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: 49 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,500 to 9,000 metres, centred over Nasiriyah, Samawah, Salman, Qal'at Salih, Khidr, Qurnah and Busayyah.

23 March 1993

(a) Northern region: 34 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 7,000 to 10,000 metres, centred over Zakho, Dohuk, Amadiyah, Mosul, Irbil, Tall Afar and Dukan.

(b) Southern region: 82 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 7,000 to 9,000 metres, centred over Busayyah, Nasiriyah, Jalibah, Artawi, Samawah, Khidr, Salman, Shatrah, Qurnah, Qal'at Salih and the area to the south of Amarah.

24 March 1993

(a) Northern region: No hostile activity was recorded in the northern region on this day.

(b) Southern region: 68 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 7,000 to 11,000 metres, centred over Nasiriyah, Salman, Samawah, Jalibah, Qal'at Salih, Ushbayjah and Busayyah.

25 March 1993

(a) Northern region: 20 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 5,000 to 7,000 metres, centred over Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Zakho, Tall Afar, the Dukan dam and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: 62 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 5,000 to 12,000 metres, centred over Basra, Nasiriyah, Samawah, Salman, Qal'at Salih and Busayyah.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/25487
29 March 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 29 MARCH 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA AND CROATIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

We have the honour to enclose the Joint Statement by the President of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina Mr. Alija Izetbegovic and President of the Republic of Croatia Dr. Franjo Tudjman, dated 27 March 1993 and signed in Zagreb.

We would kindly ask for your assistance in distributing this letter and its annex as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Muhamed SACIRBEY
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

(Signed) Mario NOBILO
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Joint statement issued by the President of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the President of the Republic of Croatia on 27 March 1993 at Zagreb

1. The Republic of Croatia supports signing of the Vance-Owen Plan by Messrs. Alija Izetbegovic and Mate Boban.

2. The President of the Republic of Croatia, Dr. Franjo Tudjman, and the President of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mr. Alija Izetbegovic, request from the international community that the Vance-Owen Plan be effectively and consistently implemented, bearing in mind the ineffective implementation of the Vance Plan in the Republic of Croatia because of the systematic obstruction by the Serbian side.

3. Both Presidents remind the international community of continuing aggression by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) against Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, which should be taken into account when planning the engagement of peace forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the extension of the UNPROFOR mandate in Croatia.

4. Presidents Tudjman and Izetbegovic express their preparedness for close cooperation between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and emphasize the need for comprehensive cooperation between the Croatian and Muslim people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the implementation of the Vance-Owen Plan, and particularly in the event of the continuation of aggression.

5. If the Serbian side fails to meet the demands of the international community for the implementation of the Vance-Owen Plan and if its aggression continues, the Presidents request that the arms embargo on Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina be lifted.

Zagreb, 27 March 1993

President of the Republic of Croatia
Dr. Franjo Tudjman

President of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Alija Izetbegovic

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Security Council

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S/25488
30 March 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 29 MARCH 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF AZERBAIJAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit to you the text of the note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijani Republic on 27 March 1993 concerning the recent large-scale attacks and violation of the State borders of the Azerbaijani Republic by the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia.

I would be grateful if you could have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Hassan A. HASSANOV
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

[Original: Russian]

Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of the Azerbaijani Republic

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijani Republic deems it necessary to state the following to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia:

On 23 March 1993, after violating the State border of the Azerbaijani Republic, Armenian armed forces undertook a large-scale offensive with the use of artillery and armoured equipment in the direction of the Zangelan district of the Azerbaijani Republic. As a result of this offensive, the villages of Ashagi Geyali and Dzhanbar were occupied and the district centre of Zangelan has been subjected to incessant artillery bombardment. Following this, during the night of 26 to 27 March, the uninterrupted bombardment of the populated areas of Soyudlu, Soyukbulak, Ashagi Airum and Dikyurt in the Kelbadzhar district of Azerbaijan began from three directions in the territory of the Vardenis district of Armenia with the use of heavy-artillery guns and "Grad" installations. Soon after the artillery preparation, three armed military helicopters of the Armenian forces violated the State border of Azerbaijan and shelled the villages referred to. There is considerable destruction and a number of victims.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijani Republic views this latest military action as a blatant violation of all the international norms laid down in the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and considers that it is designed to undermine the negotiation process aimed at settling the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan within the CSCE framework. By expanding the area of conflict to include the entire length of the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the Republic of Armenia has once again demonstrated its determination to settle the conflict through force.

In this connection, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijani Republic registers a strong protest with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia and states that such a position on the part of the leaders of the Republic of Armenia forces the Azerbaijani Republic to take adequate measures to protect the territorial integrity of its State. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijani Republic stresses that the Republic of Armenia is completely and entirely responsible for all the possible consequences of a further escalation of the conflict.

Baku, 27 March 1993

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30 March 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 17 MARCH 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF SOUTH AFRICA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to attach the text of a letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. R. F. Botha, concerning the situation in Angola. I should be grateful if the letter could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) V. R. W. STEWARD
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 16 March 1993 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of South Africa addressed to the Secretary-General

In view of the deteriorating situation in Angola and renewed allegations by the Government of the Republic of Angola regarding continued logistical support for UNITA from South Africa, I deem it necessary to once again place on record the South African Government's position in this regard.

I would like to state categorically that the South African Government does not support UNITA militarily or in any other way. The South African Government also does not support any party which opts for a military solution. It will also not support any party which attempts to obtain advantages inconsistent with the democratic process. In fact the position of the South African Government in this regard has been amply expounded in previous communications to you, which have been widely published also as documents of the Security Council.

I wish to stress that South Africa's interests would be ill-served by conflict, destruction and instability in the southern African region: consequently South Africa's interest coincide with the interests of the people of Angola in a negotiated peaceful future. It is difficult to conceive what strategic or other South African interest could be served by becoming embroiled in a conflict which is not only detrimental to bilateral relations but also to the region and the continent as a whole.

In the past, when the world was a different place, a number of other States, including the United States of America and South Africa, supported Mr. Savimbi with the overall objective of enabling him to participate in a democratic process in Angola, which would establish an elected Government and bring to an end years of internal strife. That objective was achieved, although subsequently vitiated, when elections were held in Angola at the end of September 1992 in terms of the Bicesse Accords of 31 May 1991. The considerations of earlier years obviously no longer have relevance.

The South African Government, in its contacts with both President Eduardo dos Santos and Mr. Jonas Savimbi and in its public pronouncements has consistently and strongly advocated the following:

- The obligation of the parties to honour the terms of the Bicesse Accords;

- The obligation of the parties to accept the results of the September 1992 election which were declared "generally free and fair" by the Secretary-General's Special Representative in Angola and which was formally accepted by the South African Government;

- The need for the leaders of the two main parties in Angola to enter into dialogue to solve the impasse;

- The total rejection of force as a way of achieving political ends in Angola; and,

- Support for the Security Council and Secretary-General of the United Nations in their efforts to salvage the peace and support for a continued and strong United Nations presence in Angola.

The South African and Angolan Governments have, until recently, been steadily strengthening mutually beneficial relations and had exchanged Representative Offices in each other's capitals. Agreements, subsequently interrupted by the resumption of hostilities, had been reached on cooperation in a wide range of fields such as mine-lifting, manpower training centres and medical training and assistance. The South African Government had every hope of continuing and expanding this promising relationship. The South African Government has also consistently advocated closer economic ties between South Africa and Angola. South Africa's interest lies in promoting peace and economic development, not only in Angola but in the whole of the subregion.

The South African Government has initiated a number of concrete and tangible steps to ensure that South Africa does not become embroiled in the tragic conflict in Angola, which I would like to enumerate hereunder:

- The Minister of Defence issued a statement on 26 February 1993 pointing out that in terms of existing legislation, it was a punishable offence for members of the South African Defence Force or the Reserve to render service as mercenaries or to recruit people to render service as mercenaries. In view of reports that a number of South Africans had already left for Angola, the South African Police are currently investigating possible transgressions of the applicable legislation (appendix I).

- I also issued a statement in this regard on 5 March 1993 warning South Africans who are members of the South African Defence Force or the Reserve against recruitment as mercenaries for service in neighbouring countries. I stressed the fact that this was an illegal act and that this was being done at their own risk (appendix II).

- The Minister of Defence issued a statement on 2 March 1993 rejecting allegations that South Africa was supplying arms to UNITA. He further pointed out that the Armaments Development and Production Act determined that no armaments may be exported from South Africa without a marketing and export permit, issued by the Armaments Corporation of South Africa (Armscor). He added that the Government would prosecute any transgressors (appendix III).

- The Civil Aviation authorities issued a renewed directive to all private air operators on the question of unauthorized flights beyond South Africa's boundaries on 26 February 1993 (appendix IV).

- The State President, Mr. F. W. de Klerk wrote to President Eduardo dos Santos on 1 March 1993 in response to certain alleged activities of a Namibian registered company, Namibian Commercial Aviation (NCA), in support of UNITA (appendix V).

- Due to the above-mentioned measures, the Department of Transport announced on 4 March 1993 that legal action had already been

instituted against an offender violating the prescribed civil aviation procedures (appendix VI).

- on 5 March 1993, I requested the relevant government departments to take additional steps to prevent unauthorized private flights to neighbouring countries.

- The South African authorities have also notified several private air operators in South Africa of the implications of unauthorized flights beyond South Africa's borders.

The South African Government shares the concern of the United Nations at the failure of recent efforts to arrange peace talks between the Angolan Government and UNITA in Addis Ababa. We are disappointed at the failure of UNITA, although it may have had certain security concerns, to attend the peace talks particularly in view of the elaborate and accommodating measures taken by Mrs. Margaret Anstee, the United Nations Special Representative for Angola, to enable the UNITA delegation to travel to Addis Ababa.

It remains the South African Government's firm belief that the only way ahead in Angola is the one proposed by the United Nations Security Council, amongst others in resolution 811 (1993) adopted by the Security Council on 11 March 1993, which provides for dialogue between the two parties under the auspices of the United Nations. The Bicesse Accords remain the only meaningful framework within which peace can be restored to Angola. The Bicesse Accords should be reactivated as a matter of urgency with a view to their full implementation. We believe that the dialogue that was begun in Addis Ababa in late January 1993 deserves continued support from all parties and we urge both parties to demonstrate their commitment to peace by resuming substantive talks as a matter of urgency. Decisive action by the international community is now required to get the parties back to the negotiating table.

As mentioned to you before, I believe that the presence of a large contingent of United Nations peace-keeping forces in Angola, is essential for the implementation of a lasting cease-fire as well as for the success of the peace process as a whole. I would also like to state that we have full confidence in Mrs. Margaret Anstee and the role she has played in the search for a peaceful solution in Angola.

The suffering of the innocent civilian population in Angola constitutes a major tragedy. The ongoing destruction of the economic infrastructure in Angola is senseless and counter-productive. The South African Government is therefore also concerned about threats made by UNITA regarding further destruction of the economic infrastructure and appeals to UNITA to refrain from any further such action in the interest of the country and its people.

The South African Government remains willing to assist the international community, including the United Nations and the observers to the Peace Accords, to resolve the crisis in Angola. These efforts will, however, require decisive

leadership and statesmanship by both parties. The South African Government urges both parties to stop the bloodshed that has tragically claimed thousands of lives over the past several months and to commit themselves anew to dialogue and national reconciliation.

(Signed) R. F. BOTHA

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Appendix I

Statement by the Minister of Defence, Mr. Gene Louw, on 26 February 1993

Service as mercenaries

As a result of allegations that South African citizens are recruited by other countries for service as mercenaries, I would like to point out that it is a punishable offence for members of the South African Defence Force or the Reserve to render service as mercenaries or to recruit people to render service as mercenaries.

They are apparently recruited under pretexts but the obvious aim is to fight as mercenaries.

In terms of Section 121 A of the Defence Act, Act 44 of 1957, a member of the South African Defence Force, the Reserve or the auxiliary or voluntary nursing service may not "bind himself to serve or render service as a mercenary".

This applies to all members of the Permanent Force, Citizen Force, Commandos, including National Servicemen, the Permanent Force Reserve, the Active Citizen Force Reserve and the National Reserve and includes all members between the ages of 17 and 65 years. A person convicted of a contravention of this subsection is liable to a fine not exceeding R5,000 or imprisonment not exceeding two years, or both.

In addition anybody who tries to influence a member of the Defence Force "to bind himself to serve or to render service as a mercenary', shall, if convicted of a contravention of this subsection, be liable to a fine not exceeding R10,000 or imprisonment not exceeding five years, or both.

The South African Government supports all international peace efforts as well as such efforts in the southern African region.

As an example the State President as well as the Minister of Foreign Affairs expressed on several occasions recently - inter alia in letters to President Eduardo dos Santos of Angola, Mr. Jonas Savimbi of UNITA, and Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretary-General of the United Nations - the South African Government's full support for the peace process in Angola.

The South African Government therefore supports the current United Nations initiative which has the objective of getting the parties to the negotiation table without delay in order to put an end to the military violence in that country as soon as possible.

In the interests of South Africa and of peace and stability in southern Africa, the Government will not tolerate a situation where Defence Force members, as described above, are recruited as mercenaries. Strict action will be taken against anyone who transgresses the relevant clauses of the Act.

Appendix II

Press release

The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Pik Botha, today (5 March 1993) announced that despite the Minister of Defence, Mr. Gene Louw's earlier statement warning persons not to join up as mercenaries in neighbouring countries it seems like some individuals are indeed doing so.

It needs to be stressed that those who are doing it are doing it illegally and at their own risk. Should they get caught South Africa's hands will be tied as we are not in a position to obtain Consular access or render other assistance to them.

Appendix III

Statement by the Minister of Defence, Mr. Gene Louw, on 2 March 1993

Export of weapons

From time to time rumours and reports circulate that instances in South Africa supply armaments to instances and countries in contradiction with existing legislation and regulations. Recently it has been alleged that South Africa supplies armaments to UNITA.

I reject these allegations.

The Armaments Development and Production Act determines that no armaments may be exported from South Africa without a marketing and export permit, issued by the Armaments Corporation of South Africa (Armscor).

Anyone who exports armaments without the required permit in contradiction with the Act, is guilty of an offence and upon being found guilty, is punishable with a fine not exceeding R10,000, or imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or both.

As the Minister responsible for the administration of this Act and regulations, I would like to point out that the Government will prosecute any transgressors.

Appendix IV

Advisory to pilots

Conveyance of armaments on board civil registered aircraft

The Department of Transport brings to the attention of pilots that in terms of the Convention on International Civil Aviation drawn up in Chicago during December 1944 and to which South Africa was a signatory and further adopted by the Aviation Amendment Act 1947 (Act No. 42 of 1947) and including any amendments and/or additions thereto - it is an offence to convey any armaments on board a civil aircraft without the written permission of the Minister of Transport or the Commissioner for Civil Aviation as described by Government Notice No. R901 of 4 May 1984. Pilots contravening the above law will be dealt with to the full letter of the law.

Appendix V

Letter dated 1 March 1993 from the President of South Africa addressed to the President of Angola

Thank you for your letter of 29 January 1993 in which you expressed concern about certain alleged activities of a Namibian registered company, Namibian Commercial Aviation (NCA).

In view of the seriousness of these allegations, our mutual desire for peace in Angola, as well as our desire to maintain friendly relations, I had your concerns investigated. It transpires that NCA had been in existence for nearly 15 years prior to Namibia's independence, and is a well-established commercial aviation company operating independently in the Republic of Namibia. It further emerged that none of the men listed in your letter is employed by the South African Air Force.

In view of the fact that NCA is a Namibian registered company, I would respectfully suggest that you pursue your inquiries directly with the Namibian Government. Various allegations regarding the activities of the company have to my knowledge been reported upon in the Namibian media in recent months.

According to these reports, a number of the crew members listed in your letter have on previous occasions been arrested by the Angolan authorities, and subsequently released after proper investigation. It is my understanding that flights were undertaken by NCA into Angola for humanitarian reasons, airlifting food and medical supplies to areas in need in southern Angola, many of which flights were chartered by international food relief organizations. In addition, it is my understanding that such commercial flights were also chartered by media representatives and businessmen, wishing to engage in bona fide activities in Angola.

I would like to reiterate that the South African Government is in no way engaged in activities supporting UNITA, and that South Africa has no control over any flights from countries neighbouring Angola, such as Namibia, if flights originating from these countries have as final destination locations in Angola. As for privately chartered commercial flights originating in South Africa and flying to neighbouring countries, I can assure you that the South African civil aviation authorities scrupulously adhere to internationally prescribed procedures, as well as South African legislation, in insisting that all flights leaving South African airspace file proper flight plans. In the event of flights not adhering to these procedures, the necessary legal steps will be taken against them.

You will understand that when such aircraft leave South African airspace, no further control can be exerted upon them. In addition, any attempts by Government without proper cause to inhibit or frustrate private commercial concerns from engaging in their legitimate day-to-day business in southern Africa, including commercial transactions with Angola, run the risk of legal proceedings being instituted against the South African Government.

The South African Government will not support any party which opts for a military solution in your country, nor will it support any party which attempts to obtain advantages which are inconsistent with the democratic process.

It is also my opinion that the only way ahead in Angola at this juncture, is for the two parties to engage in dialogue, under the auspices of the United Nations, and that the Bicesse Accords be urgently reactivated with a view to their full implementation.

(Signed) F. W. De KLERK

Appendix VI

Media release by Department of Civil Aviation

Monitoring of civilian flights within the Republic of South Africa and over border flights

With reference to recent press reports implying that flights within the RSA and across its borders can take place in an uncontrolled manner, the Department of Transport would like to inform the public of the regulatory requirements pertaining to all pilots.

A flight plan shall be filed in respect of:

(a) All flights to be conducted in controlled or advisory airspace: provided that this requirement shall not apply in respect of a local flight crossing an airway or advisory route at right angles or a "Visual Flight Rules" flight entering or departing from an aerodrome traffic zone or control zone, from or to an unmanned aerodrome, and where no other controlled or advisory airspace will be entered during the flight;

(b) An international flight;

(c) All flights in the public transport operation or public transport of cargo operation categories; and

(d) A flight for which alerting action is required.

These flight plans have to be filed not later than 30 minutes prior to departure with an air traffic control centre. In respect of over-border flights, any State may define additional requirements such as an application to land or overfly its territory up to seven days prior to departure.

It is also a requirement in terms of both the Domestic and the International Air Services Acts that any proposed air service to be carried out for reward may only take place once a licence has been issued by the appropriate body.

It is therefore not true to state that there will be no record of movements at all although some information may only be obtained after the fact.

It is of course true that the Civil Aviation Authority is not able to prevent people from breaking the law. However, when this happens incidents are investigated and where appropriate, prosecutions are made. In addition, there are formal communication channels to pilots, for example the Notice to Airmen (Notam) system whereby on 27 February 1993 pilots were reminded of regulations pertaining to the conveyance of armaments on board civilian aircraft. The industry is to a large extent also self-regulating in the sence that unauthorized operations are reported when they occur.

The Department therefore wishes to disagree in the strongest possible terms with the sentiments expressed in recent newspaper reports on this subject.

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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: RECENT ACTIVITIES OF THE WORKING GROUPS

CONTENTS

		Paragraphs	Page
INTRODUCTION		1 - 2	2
I.	WORKING GROUP ON BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA	3	2
II.	WORKING GROUP ON HUMANITARIAN ISSUES	4 - 8	2
III.	WORKING GROUP ON ETHNIC AND NATIONAL COMMUNITIES AND MINORITIES	9 - 20	3
IV.	WORKING GROUP ON SUCCESSION ISSUES	21 - 26	5
V.	WORKING GROUP ON ECONOMIC ISSUES	27 - 30	6
VI.	WORKING GROUP ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING AND VERIFICATION MEASURES	31 - 32	7

INTRODUCTION

1. In recent reports submitted to the Security Council, I informed the Council about developments in the peace talks on Bosnia and Herzegovina being conducted by the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (S/25050, S/25221, S/25248 and S/25403).

2. In two earlier reports, I had informed the Council about other activities undertaken within the framework of the International Conference (S/24795 of 11 November 1992 and S/25015 of 24 December 1992). The present report provides information on the activities of the Working Groups of the Conference since the beginning of 1993.

I. WORKING GROUP ON BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

3. The activities undertaken with regard to the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina have been dealt with in my recent reports to the Council (S/25050, S/25221, S/25248 and S/25403).

II. WORKING GROUP ON HUMANITARIAN ISSUES

4. The Working Group on Humanitarian Issues, chaired by Mrs. S. Ogata, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, has continued to address the plight of refugees, displaced persons and other victims of conflict. As humanitarian lead agency in the former Yugoslavia, UNHCR maintains intensive contacts with all relevant counterparts in the region. Contacts at the governmental level take place through Mrs. Ogata's Special Representative, who travels to the various capitals on a regular basis, and through her Chiefs of Mission in those capitals. These contacts are complemented and supported by official sessions of the Working Group at Geneva and in the field, as required. The Working Group has proven to be a useful forum for negotiations with the Bosnian parties.

5. On 11 January 1993, Mrs. Ogata addressed a plenary session of the peace talks on Bosnia and Herzegovina, attended by the Bosnian parties and by the Presidents of Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Serbia and Montenegro. From 24 to 27 January, she visited Zagreb, Belgrade and Sarajevo to meet with Presidents Cosic, Milosevic and Tudjman, with the Bosnian leadership, and with Generals Nambiar and Morillon of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). Upon returning to Geneva, she held separate working group sessions with President Izetbegovic, the Bosnian Croats (Mr. Boban) and the Bosnian Serbs (Dr. Karadzic).

6. Regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina, many of these contacts have concentrated on the need for unimpeded humanitarian access to all victims of conflict. During the period under review, the relief effort has been severely jeopardized. Harassment and endless delays at check-points have become daily occurrences. Fighting between Bosnian Croat and government forces was a serious set-back for the relief operation in central Bosnia, which accommodates the majority of displaced persons. UNHCR had to temporarily withdraw its staff from the

Serbian-held Banja Luka region because of security threats. Access to the government-held Bihac region was temporarily blocked by local Serb authorities in the Krajina region in Croatia, after fighting broke out in the pink zone adjacent to UNPA South. On 2 February, operations on the crucial Mostar road had to be suspended, after the killing of a UNHCR driver. On several occasions the airlift to Sarajevo had to be suspended due to security incidents, e.g., on 6 February, after a German plane was hit by anti-aircraft artillery. Most serious has been the denial of access to government-held enclaves in eastern Bosnia, inducing the Bosnian Government on 12 February to refuse further acceptance of humanitarian assistance in Sarajevo and Tuzla. After a new partial suspension, UNHCR and UNPROFOR managed to gain access to some of the enclaves, while American air drops, carried out in coordination with UNHCR, started relieving the dire conditions in other enclaves.

7. Despite these serious problems, the international relief effort, conducted by United Nations agencies, UNPROFOR, International Committee of the Red Cross and various non-governmental organizations has thus far prevented mass starvation. However, fighting and persecution continue to cause new victims and displacement, especially in eastern Bosnia. In close cooperation, the humanitarian organizations are preparing for the arrival of thousands of victims in Tuzla, central Bosnia. Of great concern are the sharply declining economic conditions in this region, as tensions between Bosnian Croat forces and the government side are negatively affecting the circulation of commercial goods.

8. Newly arriving refugees are adding to the already enormous burden of adjacent countries, where socio-economic conditions have continued to decline. For this reason, Mrs. Ogata convened on 25 March 1993 a meeting of the Humanitarian Issues Working Group, uniting all countries of the region, the international donor community and other interested States, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs and international governmental and non-governmental organizations. At this meeting the overall humanitarian situation was assessed, and a new consolidated appeal for the period 1 April-31 December 1993 was launched.

III. WORKING GROUP ON ETHNIC AND NATIONAL COMMUNITIES AND MINORITIES

9. Since the Working Group on Ethnic and National Communities and Minorities met in December with representatives of Muslims from Sandzak and of the Hungarians, Croats and Slovaks from Vojvodina, no new meeting could be arranged, due to elections and changes of the Governments in Serbia, Montenegro and in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

10. On 10 March, the Chairman of the Group, Ambassador Ahrens, and members of the Working Group, had a first meeting in Belgrade with Mrs. Savovic, the new Minister for Human Rights and Minorities in the Federal Government. In this first exchange of views, Mrs. Savovic showed a positive attitude towards the activities of the Group. The Chair stressed the importance of resuming, as soon as possible, the work of the Group on all items that had been on its agenda, so far.

11. The Group had planned to meet the same day in Belgrade with representatives of the Hungarian minority in Vojvodina, but the meeting had to be cancelled because the Hungarians were apparently unable to attend. A meeting in Belgrade with Serbs from the Gorski Kotar area in Croatia, scheduled for 10 March 1993, was also called off.

12. Since the beginning of the year, two trilateral meetings were held on minority issues in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The first took place from 20 to 22 January, in Skopje, the second on 10 and 11 February, at Geneva. Before the meeting in Skopje, the Group stopped for talks in Tirana, where they were received by President Berisha. Voicing his concern about the development in the south-eastern part of the former Yugoslavia, President Berisha expressed strong support for the endeavours of the group, adding that everything should be done to stabilize the situation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and in Kosovo.

13. The talks on the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia continue to follow the pattern of slow but steady progress. Improvements could be achieved, for instance, on the use of minority languages and the reopening of a number of secondary school classes in Albanian. Progress is under way concerning the situation in the media sector, a census with participation of the Albanians and on self-administration.

14. The European Community Commission is considering financial support for the census. On 8 March, Ambassador Rey attended a meeting in Brussels with representatives of the European Community Commission and the Council of Europe on organizational and financial aspects of the census. Everything will be done to have the census organized before the end of the year.

15. A further trilateral meeting on the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was planned to take place in Skopje on 10 and 11 March. It was the intention of the Group to clarify at that meeting remaining issues concerning the media sector as well as to take up all other pending issues such as the law on local self-government, the law on foreigners, the three laws on elementary, secondary and university education, as well as certain problems related to the implementation of the law on citizens and legislation related to the organization of administration and of the organization of the courts. Invoking technical problems, the Government asked for postponement of the meeting. It is the Group's hope that work on the outstanding issues can be pursued as soon as possible in the spirit of cooperation which has so far characterized the talks.

16. When in Belgrade, Ambassador Ahrens met, on 10 March, with Patriarch Pavle on matters related to religious services for the Serbian ethnic group in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Special Group on Kosovo

17. The Special Group on Kosovo met at Geneva from 26 to 28 January and in Belgrade on 17 and 18 February. As in past meetings, the talks were limited to the subject of education, on which the Group still endeavours to reach pragmatic solutions in the hope of improving the overall climate between the parties, which continues to be far from positive.

18. The Kosovar Albanians presented their teaching plans. These were rejected by the Government on the ground that they contained an underlying assumption of independence for Kosovo. The Government made new proposals on the reinstatement of teachers and on the recognition of years spent in the parallel school system run by the Albanians. They were rejected by the Kosovar Albanian side, which insists on the "unconditional" reopening of school premises before they would be ready to address other issues.

19. In the talks on Kosovo, fundamental issues are constantly hindering the pragmatic approach for solutions in the field of education. The Group will pursue its efforts, but at the same time it is necessary to address fundamental issues in the light of the principles agreed upon at the London Conference.

20. When in Belgrade on 10 March, the Chair emphasized to Mr. Jovanovic, the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, the necessity of this double-track approach. While agreeing in principle, the Foreign Minister stressed the desirability for success on the educational issue as a first step before other issues were approached. On 17 March, Ambassador Ahrens had a discussion with Mr. Bukoshi, who spoke on behalf of Albanians from Kosovo. There was agreement that everything should be tried to achieve progress in the ongoing talks. Mr. Bukoshi informed Ambassador Ahrens that authorities in Kosovo had taken away the passport of Professor Statovci, a member of the Kosovar Albanian negotiating team since the beginning, on whose participation the Kosovar Albanians had to insist.

IV. WORKING GROUP ON SUCCESSION ISSUES

21. The Working Group on Succession Issues, which is chaired by Ambassador J. Bojer, has met twice in 1993, from 19 to 22 January in Brussels, and from 8 to 11 March at Geneva. On 12 March 1993, a joint meeting of the Economic Issues and State Succession Working Groups was held at Geneva.

22. In the January meeting, delegations from all successor States of the former Yugoslavia participated. The delegations of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia were both delayed. On the basis of a working paper by the late Chairman of the State Succession Working Group, Mr. Henry Darwin, the participants continued drafting texts on succession with respect to citizenship, acquired rights and pensions. State archives and diplomatic and consular property were also discussed.

23. In the meeting in March, delegations from Croatia, from the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and from Slovenia took part. A representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina was present during part of the meeting as an observer. The delegation of Bosnia and Herzegovina stated that its non-participation was due to the impossibility for its delegates, who had remained in Zagreb since the previous meeting in January, to go to Sarajevo to receive instructions prior to the meeting owing to UNPROFOR's practice concerning transport of government representatives in and out of Sarajevo. The delegation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) had, on 4 March, asked for a postponement of the meeting until after 22 March because of the change of government in Belgrade. The Chairman decided not to postpone the meeting at such short notice, as other delegations had already undertaken extensive preparations for

the meeting. There were no representatives of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia present at the meeting.

24. On substantive issues, the three delegations formally participating drafted texts on succession with respect to state archives and rules concerning distribution of immovable and movable properties administered by the former Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Pension obligations was the third major issue discussed at the meeting.

25. At the joint meeting of the Economic Issues and State Succession Working Groups on 12 March, the participants discussed the implications of the conclusions in Mr. Durieux's "Chairman's Report on the Valuation of the Assets and Liabilities of the Former SFRY", of 26 February 1993, on the coordination of the future work of the two working groups.

26. The plan for the next meeting of the Working Group on Succession Issues, scheduled to take place from 5 to 7 April 1993 at Geneva, is to carry on the drafting of texts on succession with respect to financial assets and liabilities of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, rules for the distribution of immovable and movable properties (abroad), State archives, pensions, and legal problems related to the draft single inventory of the assets and liabilities of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

V. WORKING GROUP ON ECONOMIC ISSUES

27. The Working Group on Economic Issues is chaired by Mr. J. Durieux.

Meeting: Brussels, 20 and 21 January 1993

28. The six subgroups charged with the valuation of the assets and liabilities of the former Federation met to review the latest draft of a report on this valuation. The meeting revealed uneven progress across the six subgroups with some basic information still missing and some estimated values being contested. The gap between the undisputed part of the inventory and those parts which some of the delegations felt ought not to be considered in the framework of State succession remained wide.

29. Subsequent to this meeting some further information and comments were received which were included in the report. The final draft of the report was submitted to the Co-Chairmen on 4 March.

Meeting: Geneva, 17 February 1993

30. The main item on the agenda was the proposed high-level conference on the economic future of the countries of the former Yugoslavia. All delegations except Slovenia (the delegation of Bosnia and Herzegovina did not attend) thought the conference to be a useful idea, but felt that a number of conditions would need to be satisfied before it could be held, notably an effective cease-fire, the emergence of a global political settlement, progress on the lifting of sanctions and activation of the PHARE programme. Further work on the draft paper on the economic situation of the countries of the former Federation as

well as submissions from the Republics will follow, but progress is now dependent upon political factors.

VI. WORKING GROUP ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING AND VERIFICATION MEASURES

31. The Working Group on Confidence- and Security-Building and Verification Measures, chaired by Mr. V. Berasategui, recommenced its activity this year on 18 January 1993. At that meeting, the Working Group heard a report from UNHCR on incidents which had jeopardized its humanitarian airlift and which were in violation of the 15 September 1992 agreement on confidence-building measures (see S/24634). UNHCR strongly appealed to all sides to respect the humanitarian nature of the airlift.

32. In December 1992, the Working Group had begun consideration of a proposal for a preliminary exchange of information among parties in the former Yugoslavia on weapons systems and levels of armed forces, in order to facilitate confidence-building measures. At the meeting on 18 January, the Chairman of the Working Group announced that, after consultation with the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee, he was deferring further work, in the light of the crucial stage of the negotiations on a peace plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

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LETTER DATED 30 MARCH 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF AZERBAIJAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

It is with a feeling of profound concern that I inform you that the Republic of Armenia has carried out further acts of aggression against the Azerbaijani Republic.

On 27 March, units of the Armenian national army suddenly attacked the Kelbadzhar district of Azerbaijan, which borders on Armenia. The attack was carried out from two directions: directly from the territory of the Martuni district of Armenia and the territory of the Nagorny Karabakh region of the Azerbaijani Republic, which is occupied by Armenian armed forces. This action was preceded by air raids by bomber aircraft of the Armenian air force and also rocket-artillery strikes directed at the Kelbadzhar district. According to preliminary information, civilians have been killed and wounded.

On 28 March, Armenian units occupied the villages of Aggaya and Merdzhemet in the Kelbadzhar district and resumed combat operations in the Lachin district. On 29 March, having penetrated further into the Kelbadzhar and Lachin districts of Azerbaijan, they attacked 14 populated areas, 5 of which - Agdaban, Naryndzhlar, Chyragly, Tezekend and Agdzhakend - were captured.

The attack against the Kelbadzhar district, the expansion of combat operations in the Lachin district of Azerbaijan, the maintenance of tension throughout the frontier zone, including the Nakhichevan region of Azerbaijan, is yet further evidence of the expansionist policy of Armenia with respect to Azerbaijan.

Using methods that are very much based on force and having chosen the path of military confrontation, Armenia is systematically expanding the geographical area of its aggression against Azerbaijan. After occupying 10 per cent of the territory of Azerbaijan and at the same time conducting a policy of ethnic cleansing, Armenia shamelessly claims that it is allegedly "choking while encircled by a blockade".

The question arises how Armenia, which is supposedly isolated from the outer world and allegedly does not receive any food or industrial deliveries, or, above all, energy supplies, is able to conduct large-scale combat operations in the frontier districts of Azerbaijan, maintain military tension all along the

frontier between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and keep a military expeditionary corps in the Nagorny Karabakh region of the Azerbaijani Republic.

It is obvious that the claims by the Government of Armenia concerning the blockade are propagandistic in nature and designed to mislead the international community in order to conceal the truth - the intention to seize by any means part of the territory of a sovereign State - the Azerbaijani Republic.

The world community cannot remain indifferent and must condemn the aggressive actions by Armenia against Azerbaijan and call it to account.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter distributed as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Hassan A. HASSANOV
Permanent Representative

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30 March 1993

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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN CYPRUS

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 3 of resolution 796 (1992) of 14 December 1992, in which the Security Council welcomed my intention as expressed in paragraph 46 of my report to the Security Council of 1 December 1992 (S/24917 and Add.1) to pursue my consultations with the troop-contributing Governments about a restructuring of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and to report on this to the Council as soon as possible.

2. As indicated in paragraph 6 of my report of 23 September 1992 (S/24581), the size of UNFICYP has been significantly reduced because of the withdrawal of the Danish battalion (323 personnel) in December 1992 and the reductions that other troop-contributing countries have made in recent months in the size of their contingents (198 personnel from the United Kingdom, including the whole of the Force scout car squadron, 63 from Austria and 61 from Canada). The result of these reductions is that the established strength of UNFICYP (military personnel and civilian police) has been reduced from 2,141 in May 1992 to 1,513 in March 1993.

3. These reductions necessitated a major restructuring and reorganization of the Force. The required operational and organizational adjustments were in place at the commencement of the current mandate period on 16 December 1992. As described in my report of 1 December 1992 (S/24917) and on the accompanying map, the number of sectors was reduced from four to three and the number of line companies from eight to six. The three sectors are now covered by battalions provided by Austria, Canada and the United Kingdom, with each battalion comprising two line companies together with headquarters and first line support.

4. The United Kingdom's battalion has retained responsibility for most of its former area, while also assuming responsibility for the sector formerly controlled by the Danish contingent. As a result, the reduced United Kingdom battalion now exercises responsibility in an area extending from the Kokkina enclave in the far west to the United Nations protected area (UNPA) on the western edge of Nicosia. The Canadian battalion has expanded its sector (Sector Three) to the west and now covers the area from the UNPA to Athienou, including the entire portion of the buffer zone that runs through the centre of Nicosia. Sector Four, the responsibility of the Austrian battalion, continues to extend from the eastern boundary of Sector Three near Athienou eastward to the sea.

The reduction in the number of line troops necessitated a decrease in the number of permanently occupied observation posts from 51 to 42. The crucial reserve functions, as well as the reconnaissance, patrolling, and crowd control capabilities of the Ferret Scout Car Squadron are no longer available to the Force. The Force reserve has been reduced to only four reinforcement platoons.

5. As I stressed in my report of 1 December 1992 (S/24917), the successive reductions in the strength of the Force, culminating in those described above, have brought UNFICYP to a point where the viability of the present operation is in doubt.

6. Since then, the Government of Canada has announced its intention to withdraw its contingent from UNFICYP between mid-June and September of 1993. The United Kingdom has also announced its intention to reduce its support regiment by 145 personnel, thus reducing the support resources and infrastructure that have sustained UNFICYP for many years. The United Kingdom will no longer provide UNFICYP with military police, mess staff, medical and dental care, the existing vehicle maintenance workshop or the transport squadron.

7. These additional reductions will bring the Force's strength down from 1,513 to approximately 850 personnel. Unless this situation is redressed, UNFICYP will cease to be viable in June 1993.

8. Because the continued presence of UNFICYP is indispensable to the maintenance of peace in Cyprus, I have carefully reviewed the possible options for the Force's future. As part of this process and in the light of resolution 796 (1992), on 26 February the Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations, Mr. Kofi Annan, on my behalf resumed consultations with the eight troop-contributing Governments (Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland). He was assisted by the Force Commander, Major-General Michael Minehane.

9. The Force Commander briefed the representatives of contributing Governments on the operational situation subsequent to the reductions described in paragraph 6 above. Contributing countries were also briefed on the current status of the talks on the set of ideas, which will resume in the near future, and on the implementation of confidence-building measures (see my report of 19 November 1992 (S/24830)). All the troop contributors assured my representatives of their continuing support for my good offices mission in Cyprus.

10. All the contributing countries agreed that the Force would no longer be capable of fulfilling its present mandate after the forthcoming withdrawal of the Canadian contingent. They accordingly stressed the urgency of taking remedial action, including changing its financing to assessed contributions.

11. The consultations with the troop contributors focused on two alternative proposals for restructuring UNFICYP. One would entrust the Force's mandate to military observers, who would be backed up by a small infantry element. The other would restructure the Force and reduce it to the minimum number of infantry battalions required to maintain effective control of the buffer zone.

12. Under the first proposal, a minimum of 200 United Nations military observers would maintain a high profile role, patrolling the buffer zone and providing random manning of observation posts. They would also undertake local liaison functions between the parties and would continuously monitor the buffer zone in central Nicosia. In order to ensure a minimum capacity to respond effectively to incidents in the buffer zone, they would be supported by three or four infantry companies, which would occupy permanently a greatly reduced number of observation posts, would undertake some patrolling and would provide a reserve in the event of violations of the buffer zone or other incidents. But there would no longer be 24-hour surveillance of the length of the buffer zone.

13. It was recognized that military observers would require timely payment of their local living costs. This could not be assured through continued reliance on voluntary contributions. Therefore, the restructured force would have to be financed through the normal system of peace-keeping assessment. In this manner, the enormous financial responsibility carried for so many years by a very limited and dwindling number of countries would be lifted and shared by the entire membership of the organization.

14. It was understood that if this proposal were implemented, the basis for the calculation of daily subsistence allowances for military observers in Cyprus would need to be carefully examined, particularly in the light of the substantial amount of existing infrastructure in Cyprus that could be used to accommodate observers. It was further suggested that every effort should be made to find ways to economize on this expense in the event that military observers were deployed in Cyprus.

15. Most of the troop contributors expressed a preference for this proposal. Several troop contributors expressed the view that a political stalemate had develcped in Cyprus and that UNFICYP in its present form was not contributing to progress in resolving the underlying political issues. They believed that pressure needed to be put on both sides in Cyprus to change their behaviour and oblige them to deal directly with minor violations of the cease-fire. Replacing the existing operation with an observer mission in Cyprus would, they believed, send a political message to the parties. Other troop contributors agreed with the Secretariat that reducing UNFICYP any further could give rise to uncertainty and possible instability. They considered that the Force had been reduced to the minimum level that could be considered an acceptable risk.

16. My representatives expressed support for the second proposal, retaining a Force made up of formed infantry units. They reiterated that, as stated in my report of 23 September 1992 (S/24581), the normal practice when establishing a United Nations peace-keeping operation is to define the operation's mandate and then determine the resources required to implement it. The mandate should determine the resources, not vice versa. In the case of UNFICYP, the mandate had not undergone any change and, in the absence of any appreciable evolution in the situation on the island, the main functions of the Force remained:

(a) Maintenance of the military status quo and prevention of a recurrence of fighting;

(b) Humanitarian and economic activities to promote a return to normal conditions.

17. My representatives further pointed out that conditions prevailing in Cyprus at the time of a thorough review of the Force's mandate and strength in November 1990 (S/21982) had not changed and the conclusions of that review remained operationally valid. The Force's mandate and the kinds of resources required to carry it out had not been altered. The requirements for an unarmed observer mission had not been met. As the November 1990 report states, there is no agreement between the two sides about the delineation of the cease-fire lines or about what is permitted under the cease-fire, the cease-fire lines are still extremely close in some areas, UNFICYP does not have complete freedom of movement on both sides of the cease-fire lines and because of the intense distrust between the two sides, economic activity in the buffer zone (3 per cent of Cyprus) still has to be carefully controlled by UNFICYP to ensure that it does not lead to incidents. Military observers were used successfully in the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) and are at present performing effectively in several missions, including the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) as well as in the role played by observers in the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF). While these missions have sometimes been considered as possible models for a future observation mission in Cyprus, military observers would not, under the conditions currently prevailing in Cyprus, be able to carry out the mandate of UNFICYP effectively (see S/21982, paras. 55-59).

18. My representatives expressed my conviction that the current political and military situation in Cyprus and in the region does not yet justify UNFICYP being converted to an observer mission. Under its present mandate, which remains valid, the minimum strength of the Force cannot be brought below six companies on the cease-fire line if it is to remain able to fulfil its primary function of controlling the buffer zone. These companies would need to be provided by three battalions of at least 350 personnel each in order to retain the international personality of the Force and the necessary flexibility. The battalions should be drawn from existing or new troop contributors under the same financing arrangement as other peace-keeping operations, i.e., reimbursement of troop costs at the rates approved by the General Assembly from a Special Account which would be funded through assessed contributions.

19. The civilian police element of the Force should remain at their present strength and could take on some of the humanitarian tasks currently being carried out by the military. In addition, it was proposed that under this option UNFICYP headquarters staffing be reduced from 56 to 37 military posts to reflect reductions in the size of the Force in recent years.

20. As indicated above, in December 1992 the Force scout cars, which had been a feature of the Force since its inception, were withdrawn. Since then, some of the functions they performed have been carried out by a small number of Canadian armoured personnel carriers, but these will also be withdrawn in June 1993. I believe the Force Commander is correct in his assessment that UNFICYP needs the capability in situations of tension to show force when required and to be able to use an armoured reserve for reconnaissance, crowd control or rescue. An armoured unit similar to the scout car capability, but somewhat reduced in size, should be reinstated whichever option is chosen.

21. With regard to logistical support, as mentioned above, the United Kingdom has announced its intention to withdraw the majority of the existing support

structure and resources that it has generously provided to the Force. Alternative logistic support arrangements will need to be introduced in a phased manner during the next mandate period. Under both options some of the support required could be arranged through civilian contracting or, alternatively, could be contributed by a formed military supply and maintenance unit to provide second and third line support.

22. The cost of the first option (200 military observers plus four infantry companies and armoured rapid reaction elements) has been estimated and found to be marginally more expensive than continuing to deploy three small infantry battalions to control the buffer zone. Cost estimates for the two proposals may be found in the annex to the present report. Neither would be viable unless the basis for financing the Force was changed from voluntary to assessed contributions.

Observations

23. For several years my predecessor and I have predicted that unless the Security Council took the decision to convert the financing of UNFICYP to the system which has been standard for all peace-keeping operations established since 1973, the financial burden which contributing countries were being asked to bear would eventually lead to the collapse of the Force. Given the difficulties that have been encountered in making progress towards a negotiated settlement of the Cyprus problem, it is remarkable that those countries have endured for so long such an unfair system for financing the Force. Their readiness to do so should win them the deep gratitude not only of the parties in Cyprus but also of the membership as a whole. It is the patience and generosity of those countries which have until now made it possible to maintain a vitally important United Nations peace-keeping force at no cost to the great majority of the Members of the Organization. No one should blame them for finding it necessary now to lay down the burden which they have carried for so long.

24. The fact remains, however, that UNFICYP is a vitally important peace-keeping force and its current dissolution should be a matter of grave concern to the members of the Security Council, as it is to me. It is the unanimous view of my advisers, both military and civilian, that if UNFICYP lost its capacity to maintain control of the buffer zone, there would be a real danger that, without any of the parties wishing it, small incidents could rapidly escalate and threaten the cease-fire on which depends not only the security of the people of Cyprus but also the maintenance of an atmosphere conducive to success in the political negotiations.

25. For the reasons I have explained above, I believe it is important that UNFICYP retain six infantry companies on the line if it is to have the capacity to carry out its mandate. But the real question which confronts the Security Council is not whether UNFICYP's mandate can better be carried out by infantry or by a mixture of infantry and military observers. (It is not seriously argued that at the present time military observers alone could do the task.) As is shown by the table annexed to the present report, the two options are more or less comparable in cost. The point is that neither will be practicable unless the Security Council can accept funding of the Force by assessed contributions. The question before the Council is thus whether to take this decision or to

allow UNFICYP to dissolve into a token presence consisting of a few military observers.

26. The additional costs to Member States that would result from the conversion to assessed funding have seemed substantial in the past. But at this time of rapid expansion of the Organization's peace-keeping activities, they are almost marginal (a mere 1.7 per cent) by comparison with total peace-keeping expenditure, which is currently running, on an annualized basis, at about $2.8 billion per year, a figure which could more than double when UNOSOM II and a greatly enlarged operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina are deployed.

27. UNFICYP has proved its ability to keep the peace on a very sensitive front line in Cyprus. My own efforts, with the full support of the Security Council, to help the parties reach a freely negotiated settlement of their differences through the establishment of a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation have made important progress but remain at a delicate stage. I therefore strongly recommend that the Council decide urgently to convert UNFICYP to assessed funding, in order to give me the necessary time to find Member States willing to contribute the new contingents which are required to replace those who have left or are about to leave.

Annex

Twelve-month cost estimates of the two options for restructuring of the United Nations Force in Cyprus

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	Formed infantry unit option	Military observer rapid reaction option
1. Military personnel		
(a) Contingent personnel	22 910	16 810
(b) Other costs pertaining to contingents	3 390	2 750
2. Military observers	-	6 600
3. Civilian police	1 270	1 270
4. Civilian staff costs, including travel	11 200 a/	11 860 b/
5. Premises, rental and maintenance	1 840	1 780
6. Air operations	830	830
7. Vehicle operations	2 230	2 300
8. Communications and other equipment	360	360
9. Miscellaneous supplies, services	3 100	2 840
Total (gross)	47 130	47 400

a/ Provides for 38 international staff and 414 locally recruited staff.

b/ Provides for 44 international staff and 414 locally recruited staff.

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NOTE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Following consultations with the members of the Security Council, the President of the Council made the following statement, on behalf of the Council, at its 3190th meeting, on 31 March 1993, in connection with the Council's consideration of the item entitled "An agenda for peace: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping":

"The Security Council has continued its examination of the Secretary-General's report entitled 'An Agenda for Peace' (S/24111), including the problem identified in paragraphs 66-68 - the safety of United Nations forces and personnel deployed in conditions of strife. The Council has considered this question with regard to persons deployed in connection with a Security Council mandate.

"The Security Council commends the Secretary-General for drawing attention to this problem, including the unconscionable increase in the number of fatalities and incidents of violence involving United Nations forces and personnel. The Council shares fully the Secretary-General's concerns.

"The Security Council recognizes that increasingly it has found it necessary, in discharging its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, to deploy United Nations forces and personnel in situations of real danger. The Council greatly appreciates the courage and commitment of these dedicated people who accept considerable personal risk in order to implement the mandates of this Organization.

"The Security Council recalls that it has been necessary on a number of occasions to condemn incidents directed against United Nations forces and personnel. It deplores the fact that, despite its repeated calls, incidents of violence continue.

"The Council considers that attacks and other acts of violence, whether actual or threatened, including obstruction or detention of persons, against United Nations forces and personnel are wholly unacceptable and may require the Council to take further measures to ensure the safety and security of such forces and personnel.

"The Security Council reiterates its demand that States and other parties to various conflicts take all possible steps to ensure the safety and security of United Nations forces and personnel. It further demands that States act promptly and effectively to deter, prosecute and punish all those responsible for attacks and other acts of violence against such forces and personnel.

"The Security Council notes the particular difficulties and dangers that can arise where United Nations forces and personnel are deployed in situations where the State or States concerned are unable to exercise jurisdiction in order to ensure the safety and security of such forces and personnel, or where a State is unwilling to discharge its responsibilities in this regard. In such an eventuality, the Council may consider measures appropriate to the particular circumstances to ensure that persons responsible for attacks and other acts of violence against United Nations forces and personnel are held to account for their actions.

"The Security Council requests the Secretary-General to report as soon as possible on the existing arrangements for the protection of United Nations forces and personnel, and the adequacy thereof, taking into account, inter alia, relevant multilateral instruments and status of forces agreements concluded between the United Nations and host countries, as well as comments he may receive from member States, and to make such recommendations as he considers appropriate for enhancing the safety and security of United Nations forces and personnel.

"The Security Council will consider the matter further in the light of the Secretary-General's report and of work done in the General Assembly and its subsidiary bodies, including, in particular, the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations established pursuant to General Assembly resolution 2006 (XIX). In that regard, the Council recognizes the need for all relevant bodies of the Organization to take concerted action to enhance the safety and security of United Nations forces and personnel.

"The Security Council intends to continue its consideration of the Secretary-General's report entitled 'An Agenda for Peace', as indicated in the President's statement of 29 October 1992 (S/24728)."